

A Universal Hardware API for Authenticated Ciphers



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**CAESAR
Contest
2013-2017**

Cryptographic Transformations

Secret-Key Ciphers

Block Ciphers Stream Ciphers

confidence


MACs & Hash Functions

message integrity & authentication

Authenticated Ciphers

confidence + message integrity & authentication

Cryptographic Standard Contests



CAESAR Contest Timeline



- 2014.03.15: Deadline for **first-round submissions**
- 2014.04.15: Deadline for **first-round software**
- 2015.07.07: Announcement of **second-round candidates**
- 2015.09.15: Deadline for **second-round software**
-
- 2015.12.15: Deadline for **second-round Verilog/VHDL**
- 2016.03.15: Announcement of **third-round candidates**
- 2016.12.15: Announcement of **finalists**
- 2017.12.15: Announcement of **final portfolio**

Evaluation Criteria



Security

Software Efficiency

μ Processors

μ Controllers

Hardware Efficiency

FPGAs

ASICs

Flexibility

Simplicity

Licensing

Software API vs. Hardware API - Similarities

Software API

**Function
Arguments**

**Argument
Format**

Hardware API

**Core Ports
= Interface**

**Input/Output
Format**

Software API vs. Hardware API - Differences

Software API

Abstracted

**All inputs
available at the
same time**

Hardware API

**Physically
constrained**

**Inputs accepted,
outputs produced
sequentially**

Hardware API and the CAESAR Contest


- **Hardware API can have a high influence on Area and Throughput/Area ratio of all implementations**
- **Hardware API typically much more difficult to modify than Software API**
- **Without a comprehensive hardware API, the comparison of existing and future implementations highly unreliable and potentially unfair**
- **Need for a uniform hardware API, endorsed by the CAESAR Committee, and adopted by all future implementers**

Previous Work

- Popular general-purpose interfaces
 - ARM: **AXI4**, **AXI4-Lite**, **AXI4-Stream** (Advanced eXtensible Interface)
 - IBM: **PLB** (Processor Local Bus), **OPB** (On-chip Peripheral Bus)
 - Altera: **Avalon**
 - Xilinx: **FSL** (Fast Simplex Link)
 - Silicore Corp.: **Wishbone** (used by opencores.org)
- Hardware APIs used during the SHA-3 Contest
 - GMU, Virginia Tech, University College Cork, etc.
- Interfaces used so far in the CAESAR competition
 - minimalistic, algorithm specific
 - **AXI4-Stream-based** proposed by ETH
(non-uniform, algorithm-specific user and data ports)

Proposed API Specification

Input and Output of an Authenticated Cipher



Npub (Public Message Number), typically Nonce
Nsec (Secret Message Number) [supported by few algorithms]
Enc Nsec – Encrypted Secret Message Number
AD – Associated Data


Proposed Features (1)

- inputs of arbitrary size in bytes (but a multiple of a byte only)
- size of the entire message/ciphertext does not need to be known before the encryption/decryption starts (unless required by the algorithm itself)
- independent data and key inputs
- wide range of data port widths, $8 \leq w \leq 256$
- simple high-level communication protocol
- support for the burst mode
- possible overlap among processing the current input block, reading the next input block, and storing the previous output block


Proposed Features (2)

- storing decrypted messages internally, until the result of authentication is known
- support for encryption and decryption within the same core, but only one of these two operations performed at a time
- ability to communicate with very simple, passive devices, such as FIFOs
- ease of extension to support existing communication interfaces and protocols, such as
 - AMBA-AXI4 from ARM - a de-facto standard for the System-on-Chip buses
 - PCI Express – high-bandwidth serial communication between PCs and hardware accelerator boards


Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data – AEAD Interface



Typical External Circuits (1) - FIFOs




Typical External Circuits (2) – AXI4 IPs




Input/Output Format

instruction = ACTKEY
instruction = ENC
seg_0_header
seg_0 = Npub
seg_1_header
seg_1 = Nsec
seg_2_header
seg_2 = AD
seg_3_header
seg_3 = Message



instruction = ACTKEY
instruction = DEC
seg_0_header
seg_0 = Npub
seg_1_header
seg_1 = Enc Nsec
seg_2_header
seg_2 = AD
seg_3_header
seg_3 = Ciphertext
seg_4_header
seg_4 = Tag



status = PASS
seg_0_header
seg_0 = Nsec
seg_1_header
seg_1 = AD
seg_2_header
seg_2 = Message



status = FAIL


PDI for encryption

DO for encryption =
PDI for decryption

DO for decryption

High-Speed Implementations of AEAD

Block Diagram of a High-Speed Implementation of AEAD



PreProcessor and PostProcessor for High-Speed Implementations (1)

PreProcessor:

- parsing segment headers
- loading and activating keys
- Serial-In-Parallel-Out loading of input blocks
- padding input blocks
- keeping track of the number of data bytes left to process

PostProcessor:

- clearing any portions of output blocks not belonging to ciphertext or plaintext
- Parallel-In-Serial-Out conversion of output blocks into words
- formatting output words into segments
- storing decrypted messages in AUX FIFO, until the result of authentication is known
- generating an error word if authentication fails

PreProcessor and PostProcessor for High-Speed Implementations (2)

Features:


- Ease of use
- No influence on the maximum clock frequency of AEAD (up to 300 MHz in Virtex 7)
- Limited area overhead
- Clear separation between the AEAD Core unit and internal FIFOs
 - Bypass FIFO – for passing headers and associated data directly to PostProcessor
 - AUX FIFO – for temporarily storing unauthenticated messages after decryption

Benefits:

- The designers can focus on designing the CipherCore specific to a given algorithm, without worrying about the functionality common for multiple algorithms
- Full-block width interface of the CipherCore

Verification & Result Generation

Proposed Development & Benchmarking Flow



Universal Testbench & Automated Test Vector Generation

- Universal Testbench supporting any authenticated cipher core following GMU AEAD API
- Change of cipher requires only changing test vector file
- A Python script, AETVgen, created to automatically generate test vector files representing multiple test cases
 - Encryption and Decryption
 - Empty Associated Data and/or Empty Message/Ciphertext
 - Various, randomly selected sizes of AD and Message/Ciphertext
 - Valid tag and invalid tag cases
- All source codes made available at GMU ATHENa website

Result Generation

- Generation of results possible for
 - CipherCore – full block width interface, incomplete functionality
 - **AEAD Core - recommended**
 - AEAD – difficulty with setting BRAM usage to 0 (if desired)
- Use of wrappers:
 - Out-of-context (OOC) mode available in Xilinx Vivado (no pin limit)
 - Generic wrappers available in case the number of port bits exceeds the total number of user pins, when using Xilinx ISE
 - GMU Wrappers: 5 ports only (clk, rst, sin, sout, piso_mux_sel)
- Recommended **Automated Optimization Procedure**
 - **ATHENA for Xilinx ISE and Altera Quartus II**
 - **25 default optimization strategies for Xilinx Vivado**

Authenticated Ciphers Implemented Using Our Hardware API




CAESAR Candidates:

- 1. AES-COPA**
- 2. Ascon**
- 3. CLOC**
- 4. Deoxys**
- 5. ICEPOLE**
- 6. Joltik**
- 7. Keyak**
- 8. Minalpher**
- 9. OCB**
- 10. PAEQ**
- 11. POET**
- 12. PRIMATEs-HANUMAN**
- 13. PRIMATES-GIBBON**
- 14. SCREAM**

Current Standard:

15. AES-GCM

Preliminary Results for 13 Round 1 CAESAR Candidates & AES-GCM



ATHENa Database of Results for Authenticated Ciphers

<http://cryptography.gmu.edu/athena>



ATHENa Database of Results for Authenticated Ciphers

Throughput for:

Authenticated Encryption
 Authenticated Decryption
 Authentication Only

Min Area:

Max Area:

Min Throughput:

Max Throughput:

Source: Source Available

Ranking:


Throughput/Area
 Throughput
 Area

Please note that codes with primitives, megafunctions, or embedded resources are not fully portable.

Show 25 entries

Result ID	Algorithm Disable Unique	Key Size [bits]	Implementation Approach	Hardware API	Arch Type
154	ICEPOLE	128	RTL	GMU_AEAD_Core_API_v1.1	Basic Iterative
73	Keyak	128	RTL	GMU_AEAD_Core_API_v1	Basic Iterative
62	AES-GCM	128	RTL	GMU_AEAD_Core_API_v1	Basic Iterative
65	CLOC	128	HLS	GMU_AEAD_Core_API_v1	Basic Iterative
80	PRIMATEs-GIBBON	120	RTL	GMU_AEAD_Core_API_v1	Basic Iterative
144	OCB	128	RTL	GMU_AEAD_Core_API_v1	Basic Iterative
124	PRIMATEs-HANUMAN	120	HLS	GMU_AEAD_Core_API_v1	Basic Iterative
86	SCREAM	128	RTL	GMU_AEAD_Core_API_v1	Basic Iterative
142	Joltik	128	RTL	GMU_AEAD_Core_API_v1	Basic Iterative
75	POET	128	RTL	GMU_AEAD_Core_API_v1	Basic Iterative
60	AES-COPA	128	RTL	GMU_AEAD_Core_API_v1	Basic Iterative

AEAD Core vs. CipherCore Area Overhead for Virtex-6



$$\text{Overhead} = \frac{\text{LUT(AEAD_Core)} - \text{LUT(CipherCore)}}{\text{LUT(AEAD_Core)}} \times 100\%$$

Conclusions

- Complete Hardware API for authenticated ciphers
 - The Detailed Specification - **ePrint 2015/669**
- GMU hardware API with supporting materials
 - Available at: <https://cryptography.gmu.edu/athena>
 - Universal testbench and Automated Test Vector Generation
 - PreProcessor and PostProcessor Units for high-speed implementations
 - Universal wrappers and scripts for generating results
 - Ease of recording and comparing results using ATHENa database
- GMU proposal open for discussion and possible improvements through
 - Better specification
 - Better implementation of supporting codes

Future Work



- Support for two-pass algorithms
- Pipelining of multiple streams of data
- Detection and reporting of input formatting errors
- Accepting inputs with padding done in software

Thank you!

Comments?

Questions?

Suggestions?



<http://cryptography.gmu.edu/athena>

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